Our Identity, Responsibility and Biology

Philosophical Papers:3-14 (2004)
Abstract Eric Olson argues in The Human Animal that thought-experiments involving body-swapping do not in the end offer any support to psychological continuity theories, nor do they pose any threat to his Biological View. I argue that he is mistaken in at least the second claim.
Keywords Eric Olson  Biological View of Identity  Thought-experiments
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