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  • Ansgar Beckermann (1992). States, State Types, and the Causation of Behavior. Erkenntnis 36 (3):267-282.
    Mental Causation in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 107.1Wim de Muijnck (2004). Two Types of Mental Causation. Philosophical Explorations 7 (1):21-35.
    In this paper I distinguish two types of mental causation, called 'higher-level causation' and 'exploitation'. These notions superficially resemble the traditional problematic notions of supervenient causation and downward causation, but they are different in crucial respects. My new distinction is supported by a radically externalist competitor of the so-called Standard View of mental states, i.e. the view that mental states are brain states. I argue that on the Alternative View, the notions of 'higher-level causation' and 'exploitation' can in combination dissolve (...) the problem of mental causation as standardly discussed. (shrink)
    Mental Causation in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 85.3Jakob Hohwy (2005). The Experience of Mental Causation. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):377-400.
    subjects mean when they report their mental states it is useful to be guided by a sound grasp of their concepts for mental events. 3 Though this is often ignored in favor of libertarian notions of free will, in which free action is seen as completely undetermined by the subject.
    Consciousness of Action in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 83.0Pierre Jacob (1992). Externalism and Mental Causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:203-19.
    Externalism and Mental Causation in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 82.9Sara Worley (1993). Mental Causation and Explanatory Exclusion. Erkenntnis 39 (3):333-358.
    Kim argues that we can never have more than one complete and independent explanation for a single event. The existence of both mental and physical explanations for behavior would seem to violate this principle. We can avoid violating it only if we suppose that mental causal relationships supervene on physical causal relationships. I argue that although his solution is attractive in many respects, it will not do as it stands. I propose an alternate understanding of supervenient causation which preserves the (...) advantages of Kim's account while avoiding the problems. My analysis involves appeal to counterfactuals. Any counterfactual analysis must confront the problem that mental states appear to be screened off from causal relevance by physical states. I argue that screening off is not a problem, because cases in which mental states appear to be screened off are cases in which background conditions are not held constant. (shrink)
    Mental Causation in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 81.7Kirk A. Ludwig (1998). Functionalism, Causation and Causal Relevance. Psyche 4 (3).
    causal relevance, a three-place relation between event types, and circumstances, and argue for a logical independence condition on properties standing in the causal relevance relation relative to circumstances. In section 3, I apply these results to show that functionally defined states are not causally relevant to the output or state transitions in terms of which they are defined. In section 4, I extend this result to what that output in turn causes and to intervening mechanisms. In section 5, I examine (...) the implications of this result for functional theories of mental states. In section 6, I distinguish between functional descriptions of properties and functional definitions of properties, and argue the former present no obstacle to mental states being causally relevant to behavior, but that this is so because they do not treat mental states as functional states. In section 7, I examine the nature of explanations that appeal to functional states or properties. section 8 identifies some difficulties that arise in thinking about specifically conscious mental states as functional states. section 9 is a brief conclusion. (shrink)
    Functionalism, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 81.2Fred Dretske (1993). Mental Events as Structuring Causes of Behavior. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
    Mental Causation in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 77.8Paul M. Pietroski (1994). Mental Causation for Dualists. Mind and Language 9 (3):336-66.
    Dualism, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 77.6Ralph D. Ellis (2001). Can Dynamical Systems Explain Mental Causation? Journal of Mind And Behavior 22 (3):311-334.
    Mental Causation in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 76.1Martha J. Farah (2008). Neuroethics and the Problem of Other Minds: Implications of Neuroscience for the Moral Status of Brain-Damaged Patients and Nonhuman Animals. Neuroethics 1 (1).
    Our ethical obligations to another being depend at least in part on that being’s capacity for a mental life. Our usual approach to inferring the mental state of another is to reason by analogy: If another being behaves as I do in a circumstance that engenders a certain mental state in me, I conclude that it has engendered the same mental state in him or her. Unfortunately, as philosophers have long noted, this analogy is fallible because behavior and mental states (...) are only contingently related. If the other person is acting, for example, we could draw the wrong conclusion about his or her mental state. In this article I consider another type of analogy that can be drawn between oneself and another to infer the mental state of the other, substituting brain activity for behavior. According to most current views of the mind–body problem, mental states and brain states are non-contingently related, and hence inferences drawn with the new analogy are not susceptible to the alternative interpretations that plague the behavioral analogy. The implications of this approach are explored in two cases for which behavior is particularly unhelpful as a guide to mental status: severely brain–damaged patients who are incapable of intentional communicative behavior, and nonhuman animals whose behavioral repertoires are different from ours and who lack language. (shrink)
    Neuroethics in Applied Ethics
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  • 75.2Terry Horgan (2007). Mental Causation and the Agent-Exclusion Problem. Erkenntnis 67 (2).
    The hypothesis of the mental state-causation of behavior (the MSC hypothesis) asserts that the behaviors we classify as actions are caused by certain mental states. A principal reason often given for trying to secure the truth of the MSC hypothesis is that doing so is allegedly required to vindicate our belief in our own agency. I argue that the project of vindicating agency needs to be seriously reconceived, as does the relation between this project and the MSC hypothesis. Vindication requires (...) addressing what I call the agent-exclusion problem: the prima facie incompatibility between the intentional content of agentive experience and certain metaphysical hypotheses often espoused in philosophy. (shrink)
    The Exclusion Problem in Philosophy of Mind
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