Philosophical Papers 35 (1):29-54 (2006)
|Abstract||Philosophers have traditionally used thought-experiments in their endeavours to find a satisfactory account of the self and personal identity. Yet there are considerations from empirical psychology as well as related ones from philosophy itself that appear to completely undermine the method of thought-experiment. This paper focuses on both sets of considerations and attempts a defence of the method.|
|Keywords||Metaphysics Personal Identity Psychology Thought Experiment|
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