The Generality Constraint and the Structure of Thought

Mind 121 (483):563-600 (2012)
According to the Generality Constraint, mental states with conceptual content must be capable of recombining in certain systematic ways. Drawing on empirical evidence from cognitive science, I argue that so-called analogue magnitude states violate this recombinability condition and thus have nonconceptual content. I further argue that this result has two significant consequences: it demonstrates that nonconceptual content seeps beyond perception and infiltrates cognition; and it shows that whether mental states have nonconceptual content is largely an empirical matter determined by the structure of the neural representations underlying them
Keywords Generality Constraint  nonconceptual content  analog magnitude  animal thought  animal concepts  conceptual content
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzs077
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References found in this work BETA
Lisa Feigenson (2007). The Equality of Quantity. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (5):185-187.

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Citations of this work BETA
Jacob Beck (2014). Analogue Magnitude Representations: A Philosophical Introduction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (4):axu014.

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