Understanding Quine's famous `statement'

Erkenntnis 55 (1):73-84 (2001)
Abstract
I argue that Quine''s famous claim, any statement can be held true come what may, demands an interpretation that implies that the meanings of the expressions in the held-true statement change. The intended interpretation of this claim is not clear from its context, and so it is often misunderstood by philosophers (and is misleadingly taught to their students). I explain Fodor and Lepore''s (1992) view that the above interpretation would render Quine''s assertion entirely trivial and reply, on both textual and philosophical grounds, that only this trivial reading is consistent with Quine''s famous denial of analyticity. I also explain briefly how the trivial reading lends support to meaning holism, which, regardless of one''s views of its consequences, is an important position in the philosophy of language and mind.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,357
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA
    Gábor Á Zemplén (2006). The Development of the Neurath Principle: Unearthing the Romantic Link. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (4):585-609.
    Similar books and articles
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-01-28

    Total downloads

    58 ( #22,302 of 1,088,814 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,666 of 1,088,814 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.