Visual information processing and phenomenal consciousness

In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh (1995)
Abstract
As far as an adequate understanding of phenomenal consciousness is concerned, representationalist theories of mind which are modelled on the information processing paradigm, are, as much as corresponding neurobiological or functionalist theories, confronted with a series of arguments based on inverted or absent qualia considerations. These considerations display the following pattern: assuming we had complete knowledge about the neural and functional states which subserve the occurrence of phenomenal consciousness, would it not still be conceivable that these neural states (or states with the same causal r.
Keywords Brain  Consciousness  Information  Vision
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