Why We Can't Say What Animals Think

Philosophical Psychology:1-27 (forthcoming)
Abstract Realists about animal cognition confront a puzzle. If animals have real, contentful cognitive states, why can’t anyone say precisely what the contents of those states are? I consider several possible resolutions to this puzzle that are open to realists, and argue that the best of these is likely to appeal to differences in the format of animal cognition and human language.
Keywords animal cognition  animal thought  realism  indeterminacy  representational format
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