Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics

Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1069-1083 (2010)
Abstract
Here I examine the major theories of ethical intuitions, focusing on the epistemic status of this class of intuitions. We cover self-evidence theory, seeming-state theory, and some of the recent contributions from experimental philosophy.
Keywords ethical intuitions  moral epistemology  ethics
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    References found in this work BETA
    Robert Audi (2008). Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):475 - 492.
    Robert Audi (2010). Moral Perception and Moral Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):79-97.
    Robert Audi (1999). Self-Evidence. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):205-228.

    View all 37 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Robert Cowan (2013). Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):n/a-n/a.
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