David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Minds and Machines 18 (4):443-459 (2008)
Weak emergence is the view that a system’s macro properties can be explained by its micro properties but only in an especially complicated way. This paper explains a version of weak emergence based on the notion of explanatory incompressibility and “crawling the causal web.” Then it examines three reasons why weak emergence might be thought to be just in the mind. The first reason is based on contrasting mere epistemological emergence with a form of ontological emergence that involves irreducible downward causation. The second reason is based on the idea that attributions of emergence are always a reflection of our ignorance of non-emergent explanations. The third reason is based on the charge that complex explanations are anthropocentric. Rather than being just in the mind, weak emergence is seen to involve a distinctive kind of complex, macro-pattern in the mind-independent objective micro-causal structure that exists in nature. The paper ends by addressing two further questions. One concerns whether weak emergence applies only or mainly to computer simulations and computational systems. The other concerns the respect in which weak emergence is dynamic rather than static
|Keywords||Computational emergence Dynamic emergence Epistemological emergence Explanatory incompressibility Micro-causal network Micro-causal web Weak emergence|
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References found in this work BETA
Robert W. Batterman (2002). The Devil in the Details: Asymptotic Reasoning in Explanation, Reduction, and Emergence. Oxford University Press.
Jaegwon Kim (1999). Making Sense of Emergence. Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):3-36.
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Stephen Wolfram (forthcoming). 21 Undecidability and Intractability in Theoretical Physics. Emergence: Contemporary Readings in Philosophy and Science.
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Citations of this work BETA
Elanor Taylor (2015). An Explication of Emergence. Philosophical Studies 172 (3):653-669.
Jason Megill (2013). A Defense of Emergence. Axiomathes 23 (4):597-615.
Philippe Huneman (2012). Determinism, Predictability and Open-Ended Evolution: Lessons From Computational Emergence. Synthese 185 (2):195-214.
Leonardo Bich (2012). Complex Emergence and the Living Organization: An Epistemological Framework for Biology. Synthese 185 (2):215-232.
Michel Bitbol (2012). Downward Causation Without Foundations. Synthese 185 (2):233-255.
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