Might All Normativity Be Queer?

Abstract
Here I discuss the conceptual structure and core semantic commitments of reason-involving thought and discourse needed to underwrite the claim that ethical normativity is not uniquely queer. This deflates a primary source of ethical scepticism and it vindicates so-called partner in crime arguments. When it comes to queerness objections, all reason-implicating normative claims?including those concerning Humean reasons to pursue one's ends, and epistemic reasons to form true beliefs?stand or fall together
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References found in this work BETA
Juan Comesaña (2005). We Are (Almost) All Externalists Now. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):59–76.
Juan Comesana (2005). We Are (Almost) All Externalists Now. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):59-76.
James Dreier (1997). Humean Doubts About the Practical Justification of Morality. In Garrett Cullity & Gaut Berys (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford Clarendon Press. 81--100.

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Citations of this work BETA
Matthew S. Bedke (2012). Against Normative Naturalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):111 - 129.
Stan Husi (2013). Why Reasons Skepticism is Not Self‐Defeating. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):424-449.
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