Graduate studies at Western
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (1):85 - 111 (2008)
|Abstract||There are a number of proposals as to exactly how reasons, ends and rationality are related. It is often thought that practical reasons can be analyzed in terms of practical rationality, which, in turn, has something to do with the pursuit of ends. I want to argue against the conceptual priority of rationality and the pursuit of ends, and in favor of the conceptual priority of reasons. This case comes in two parts. I first argue for a new conception of ends by which all ends are had under the guise of reasons. I then articulate a sense of rationality, procedural rationality, that is connected with the pursuit of ends so conceived, where one is rational to the extent that one is motivated to act in accordance with reasons as they appear to be. Unfortunately, these conceptions of ends and procedural rationality are inadequate for building an account of practical reasons, though I try to explain why it is that the rational pursuit of ends generates intuitive but misleading accounts of genuine normative reasons. The crux of the problem is an insensitivity to an is-seems distinction, where procedural rationality concerns reasons as they appear, and what we are after is a substantive sense of rationality that concerns reasons as they are. Based on these distinct senses of rationality, and some disambiguation of what it is to have a reason, I offer a critique of internalist analyses of one’s reasons in terms of the motivational states of one’s ideal, procedurally rational self, and I offer an alternative analysis of one’s practical reasons in terms of practical wisdom that overcomes objections to related reasons externalist views. The resulting theory is roughly Humean about procedural rationality and roughly Aristotelian about reasons, capturing the core truths of both camps.|
|Keywords||Normative reasons Motivating reasons Practical wisdom Practical rationality Ends Means–ends Reasoning Procedural rationality Substantive rationality End setting attitudes Reason Reasons internalism Reasons externalism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Ricardo F. Crespo (2007). 'Practical Comparability' and Ends in Economics. Journal of Economic Methodology 14 (3):371-393.
Terrence Kelly (2004). Practical Rationality in Social Scientific Explanation: The Case of Residential Segregation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (1):3-19.
Sigrún Svavarsdóttir (2008). The Virtue of Practical Rationality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):1-33.
G. F. Schueler (2003). Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action. Oxford University Press.
Michael Smith (2007). Is There a Nexus Between Reasons and Rationality? Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 (1):279-298.
Donald C. Hubin (1999). What's Special About Humeanism. Noûs 33 (1):30-45.
Joshua Gert (2005). A Functional Role Analysis of Reasons. Philosophical Studies 124 (3):353 - 378.
Joshua Gert (2008). Putting Particularism in its Place. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):312-324.
Edward Hinchman (2013). Rational Requirements and 'Rational' Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):529-552.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads80 ( #11,976 of 722,935 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #14,866 of 722,935 )
How can I increase my downloads?