David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):479-486 (2011)
Recent work at the junction of epistemology and political theory focuses on the notion of epistemic injustice, the injustice of being wronged as a knower. Miranda Fricker (2007) identifies two kinds of epistemic injustice. I focus here on hermeneutical injustice in an attempt to identify a difficulty for Fricker's account. In particular, I consider the significance of background social conditions and suggest that an epistemic injustice should not rely on other forms of disadvantage to achieve its status as an injustice. Thus reformulated, the notion of epistemic injustice can help us to achieve an even deeper understanding of the relationship between knowledge and privilege
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References found in this work BETA
Miranda Fricker (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford University Press.
Martha Nussbaum (2001). Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge University Press.
Amartya Sen (2009). The Idea of Justice. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
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