Reliabilism and deflationism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):495 – 510 (2006)
Abstract
In this article I examine several issues concerning reliabilism and deflationism. I critique Alvin Goldman's account of the key differences between correspondence and deflationary theories and his claim that reliabilism can be combined only with those truth theories that maintain a commitment to truthmakers. I then consider how reliability could be analysed from a deflationary perspective and show that deflationism is compatible with reliabilism. I close with a discussion of whether a deflationary theory of knowledge is possible
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Brandom (1988). Pragmatism, Phenomenalism, and Truth Talk. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):75-93.

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Similar books and articles
Jennifer Nagel (forthcoming). Knowledge and Reliability. In Hilary Kornblith & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Alvin Goldman and his Critics. Blackwell.
James O. Young (2009). Truth, Correspondence and Deflationism. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (4):563-575.
Michael Levin (1997). You Can Always Count on Reliabilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):607-617.
Michael Levin (1997). You Can Always Count on Reliabilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):607 - 617.
Alvin Goldman, Reliabilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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