Seeing causing

Abstract
Singularists about causation often claim that we can have experiences as of causation. This paper argues that regularity theorists need not deny that claim; hence the possibility of causal experience is no objection to regularity theories of causation. The fact that, according to a regularity theorist, causal experience requires background theory does not provide grounds for denying that it is genuine experience. The regularity theorist need not even deny that non-inferential perceptual knowledge of causation is possible, despite the fact that such knowledge would sometimes allow us to make inferences about what happens in far-off places and times
Keywords Causation  Epistemology  Knowledge  Perception  Regularity
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Jennifer Church (2010). Seeing Reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):638-670.
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