Graduate studies at Western
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):257-280 (2003)
|Abstract||Singularists about causation often claim that we can have experiences as of causation. This paper argues that regularity theorists need not deny that claim; hence the possibility of causal experience is no objection to regularity theories of causation. The fact that, according to a regularity theorist, causal experience requires background theory does not provide grounds for denying that it is genuine experience. The regularity theorist need not even deny that non-inferential perceptual knowledge of causation is possible, despite the fact that such knowledge would sometimes allow us to make inferences about what happens in far-off places and times|
|Keywords||Causation Epistemology Knowledge Perception Regularity|
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