Online research in philosophy

In this paper, I consider whether tenses, temporal indexicals, and other indexicals are contextually dependent on the context of assessment (or a-contextual ), rather than, as is usually thought, contextually dependent on the context of utterance ( u-contextual ). I begin by contrasting two possible linguistic norms, governing our use of context sensitive expressions, especially tenses and temporal indexicals (§§2 and 3), and argue that one of these norms would make those expressions u-contextual, while the other would make them a-contextual (§4). I then ask which of these two norms are followed by English speakers (§5). Finally, I argue that the existence of a-contextuality does not in any sense entail 'relativism' about truth (§6).

Within the class of indexicals, a distinction is often made between “pure” or “automatic” indexicals on one hand, and demonstratives or “discretionary” indexicals on the other. The idea is supposed to be that certain indexicals refer automatically and invariably to a particular feature of the utterance context: ‘I’ refers to the speaker, ‘now’ to the time of utterance, ‘here’ to the place of utterance, etc. Against this view, I present cases where reference shifts from the speaker, time, or place of utterance to some other object, time, or place. I consider and reject the claim that these counterexamples to the automatic indexical theory all involve non-literal uses of indexicals and argue that they cannot be explained away on the grounds that they involve conversational implicature or pretense.

According to McCall and Lowe (2003) interpreting the twins’ paradox reconciles the A-theorist’s notion of temporal passage or flow with the special theory of relativity. Miller, however, recalls that “the B-theorist never denied that there was temporal passage in some sense of the term” (Miller 2004, 204), and argues convincingly that McCall and Lowe stipulate nothing other than this B-theorist’s sense of temporal succession. But, as I want to show, we need in fact the A-theorist’s or even presentist’s account of temporal passage in the sense of a ‘moving now’ in order to preserve the temporal content of the twins’ paradox. It is essential, I think, that for a temporal understanding of the twins’ paradox proper times and coordinate times have to be combined in a way that only the presentists can cope.

Many philosophers say that time involves a kind of passage that distinguishes it from space. A traditional objection is that this passage would have to occur at some rate, yet we cannot say what the rate would be. The paper argues that the real problem with time’s passage is different: time would have to pass at one second per second, yet this is not a rate of change. This appears to refute decisively not only the view that time passes, but any tensed theory of time.

I propose that the passage of time is the successive occurrence of sets of simultaneous events (assuming classical or Newtonian spacetime structure as background). This conception of passage, I claim, is lean enough to survive the criticisms of passage-deniers while robust enough to satisfy the needs of passage-affirmers. I undertake to describe and defend this minimal notion of passage.

Machine generated contents note: Preface; Introduction; Part I. Times New and Old: 1. McTaggart's systems; 2. Countenancing the Doxai; Part II. The Mater of Time: Motion: 3. Time is not motion; 4. Aristotelian motion (Kinesis); 5. 'The before and after in motion'; Part III. The Form of Time: Perception: 6. Number (Arithmos) and perception (Aisthesis); 7. On a moment's notice; 8. The role of imagination; 9. Time and the common perceptibles; 10. The hylomorphic interpretation illustrated; Part IV. Simultaneity and Temporal Passage: 11. Simultaneity and other temporal relations; 12. Temporal passage; 13. Dissolving the puzzles of IV.10; 14. Concluding summary and historical significance; Bibliography.

I first distinguish several notions that have traditionally been conflated (or otherwise neglected) in discussions of the metaphysics of time. Thus, for example, I distinguish between the passage of time and temporal becoming. The former is, I maintain, a confused notion that does not represent a feature of the world; whereas a proper understanding of the latter provides the key for a plausible and comprehensive account of the nature of temporal reality. There are two general classes of views of the nature of temporal reality; proponents of particular views in both classes attempt to account for the phenomenon of temporal becoming in terms of qualitative change. I argue that any such account – in terms of change – is irredeemably problematic. And so I propound a different account of temporal becoming, based on the notion that temporal reality is transient, which provides the means to characterize intuitively and vividly the significant effects of time on the metaphysical nature of the world.

The theorist who denies the objective reality of non-relational temporal properties, or ‘A-series’ determinations, must explain our experience of the passage of time. D.H. Mellor, a prominent denier of the objective reality of temporal passage, draws, in part, on Kant in offering a theory according to which the experience of temporal passage is the result of the projection of change in belief. But Mellor has missed some important points Kant has to make about time-awareness. It turns out that Kant's theory of time-awareness also involves projection – but for him, the projection of temporal passage is necessary to any coherent experience at all, and for this reason events in the world cannot be represented except as exhibiting real tensed change. Consequently we cannot intelligibly suppose the world we know to be without the passage of time. This fact would permit a modest transcendental argument the conclusion of which is that we are entitled to describe the world in terms of temporal passage.

This is an expanded and revised discussion of the argument briefly put forward in my 'A New Problem for the A-Theory of Time', where it is claimed that it is impossible to experience real temporal passage and that no such phenomenon exists. In the first half of the paper the premises of the argument are discussed in more detail than before. In the second half responses are given to several possible objections, none of which were addressed in the earlier paper. There is also some discussion of some related epistemic arguments against the passage of time given by Huw Price and David Braddon-Mitchell along with objections raised against them recently by Tim Maudlin and Peter Forrest respectively.