David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):159-188 (2005)
How does the concept of a person affect our beliefs about ourselves and the world? In an intriguing recent addition to his established Reductionist view of personal identity, Derek Parfit speculates that there could be beings who do not possess the concept of a person. Where we talk and think about persons, selves, subjects, or agents, they talk and think about sequences of thoughts and experiences related to a particular brain and body. Nevertheless their knowledge and experience of the world is unaffected, in that it is largely like our own. It is their view of ‘themselves’ that is different (and superior) to ours. My paper critically assesses this ‘impersonal beings’ hypothesis through an examination of Parfit’s construal of the concept of a person. I argue that Parfit’s understanding of the concept of a person undermines his impersonal beings hypothesis.
|Keywords||personal identity reductionism cocept of " person" Derek Parfit impersonal beings self|
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References found in this work BETA
Lynne Rudder Baker (2000). Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge University Press.
Quassim Cassam (1989). Kant and Reductionism. Review of Metaphysics 43 (September):72-106.
Quassim Cassam (1993). Parfit on Persons. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93:17-37.
Quassim Cassam (1997). Self and World. Oxford University Press.
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
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