Reasons to Live versus Reasons not to Die
Graduate studies at Western
Think 10 (28):67-76 (2011)
|Abstract||‘Any reason for living is an excellent reason for not dying’ (Steven Luper-Foy, 'Annihilation'). Some claims seem so clearly right that we don’t think to question them. Steven Luper-Foy’s remark is like that. It borders on the ‘trivially true’ (i.e. so obviously true as to be uninteresting). If I have a reason to live, surely I likewise have a reason not to die. It may then be surprising to learn that so many philosophers disagree with this claim—either directly or by implication. I will look at some of the things people say that stand in opposition to Luper-Foy’s claim. I will also consider what is needed in order to agree with it. The views canvassed cover broad issues concerning life and death, and what matters to us with respect to both.|
|Keywords||death Epicurus immortality Thomas Nagel reasons to live what matters in survival|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|External links||This entry has no external links. Add one.|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Steven Luper (2004). Posthumous Harm. American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1):63 - 72.
David Benatar (ed.) (2009). Life, Death, and Meaning: Key Philosophical Readings on the Big Questions. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc..
Anthony Robert Booth (forthcoming). Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object-Given Reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Ulrike Heuer (2010). Reasons and Impossibility. Philosophical Studies 147 (2):235 - 246.
Dale Dorsey (2008). Hume's Internalism Reconsidered. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
Benjamin Kiesewetter (2012). A Dilemma for Parfit's Conception of Normativity. Analysis 72 (3):466-474.
Duncan MacIntosh (2003). Prudence and the Temporal Structure of Practical Reasons. In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford.
Simon Robertson (2008). Not so Enticing Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):263 - 277.
David-Hillel Ruben (2010). The Causal and Deliberative Strength of Reasons for Action. In J. Aguilar & A. Buckareff (eds.), Causing Human Action: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. Bradford.
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2011). How to Be a Teleologist About Epistemic Reasons. In Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
Dean Lubin (2009). External Reasons. Metaphilosophy 40 (2):273-291.
Duncan MacIntosh (2001). Prudence and the Reasons of Rational Persons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):346 – 365.
Anthony L. Brueckner (1993). Parfit on What Matters in Survival. Philosophical Studies 70 (1):1-22.
Derek Parfit (1997). Reasons and Motivation. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):99–130.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2012-10-11
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?