The new neo-Kantian and reductionist debate

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):331-350 (2003)
Has Derek Parfit modified his views on personal identity in light of Quassim Cassam’s neo-Kantian argument that to experience the world as objective, we must think of ourselves as enduring subjects of experience? Both parties suggest there is no longer a serious dispute between them. I retrace the path that led to this truce, and contend that the debate remains open. Parfit’s recent work reveals a re-formulation of his ostensibly abandoned claim that there could be impersonal descriptions of reality. I show why Parfit still needs this claim, and how it conflicts with the neo-Kantian view.
Keywords neo-Kantian views of the self  reductionism  personal identity  self  Derek Parfit  Quassim Cassam
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DOI 10.1046/j.1468-0114.2003.00177.x
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