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  • David Beisecker (2005). Phenomenal Consciousness, Sense Impressions, and the Logic of 'What It's Like'. In Ralph D. (Ed) Ellis & Natika (Ed). Newton (eds.), Consciousness & Emotion: Agency, Conscious Choice, and Selective Perception. John Benjamins.
    What is it Like? in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 75.5Austen Clark, Perception Preattentive and Phenomenal.
    Recent work in experimental psychology and neuroscience has revealed a rather surprising architecture for early (or preattentive) perceptual processes. This paper will describe some of the surprising features of that architecture, and how they bear on recent philosophical debates about the notion of phenomenal consciousness. I will argue that the common sense idea that states of phenomenal consciousness are states of a unitary kind cannot survive confrontation with the details of how our early perceptual processing works. In particular, that architecture (...) forces us to contemplate the prospect of phenomenal consciousness being sundered in two, with states that have phenomenal character making an appearance far before the arrival of anything one could call consciousness or awareness. (shrink)
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  • 70.5Austen Clark (2001). Phenomenal Consciousness so-Called. In Werner Backhaus (ed.), Neuronal Coding of Perceptual Systems. World Scientific.
    "Consciousness" is a multiply ambiguous word, and if our goal is to explain perceptual consciousness we had better be clear about which of the many senses of the word we are endorsing when we sign on to the project. I describe some of the relatively standard distinctions made in the philosophical literature about different meanings of the word "conscious". Then I consider some of the arguments of David Chalmers and of Ned Block that states of "phenomenal consciousness" pose special and (...) intractable problems for the scientific understanding of perception. I argue that many of these problems are introduced by obscurities in the term itself, and propose a distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic senses of the term "phenomenal consciousness". That distinction helps explain why phenomenal consciousness seems so mysterious to so many people. States of "phenomenal consciousness" are not states of one, elemental (and inexplicable) kind; they are a ragtag lot, of differing levels of complexity, corralled under one heading by a regrettable ambiguity in our terminology. (shrink)
    The Concept of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 69.3Nicholas Georgalis (2003). The Fiction of Phenomenal Intentionality. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):243-256.
    This paper argues that there is no such thing as ?phenomenal intentionality?. The arguments used by its advocates rely upon an appeal to ?what it is like? (WIL) to attend on some occasion to one?s intentional state. I argue that there is an important asymmetry in the application of the WIL phenomenon to sensory and intentional states. Advocates of ?phenomenal intentionality? fail to recognize this, but this asymmetry undermines their arguments for phenomenal intentionality. The broader issue driving the advocacy of (...) phenomenal intentionality is the belief that consciousness must somehow be implicated in intentionality. With this I agree. But because of the asymmetry of application of WIL, the path chosen by advocates of phenomenal intentionality to secure this conclusion cannot succeed. A brief overview of recent philosophy of mind explains the temptation to take this wrong path. Fortunately, there are other routes that implicate consciousness in intentionality. In consequence, though there is no phenomenal intentionality, there is a phenomenology of intentionality. (shrink)
    Phenomenal Intentionality in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 66.5Bill Faw (2002). Phenomenal, Access, and Reflexive Consciousness: The Missing 'Blocks' in Ned Block's Typlogy. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (2):145-158.
    The Concept of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 65.7David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44 (1):32-58.
    Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This paper offers an account of the kind of intentional state phenomenal states are: I argue that they are underived intentional states. This account of phenomenal states is equivalent to two theses: first, all possible phenomenal states are underived intentional states; second, all possible underived intentional states are phenomenal states. I clarify these claims and argue for each of them. I also address objections which touch on a range (...) of topics, including meaning holism and concept empiricism. I conclude with a brief discussion of the consequences of the proposed view for the project of naturalizing consciousness. (shrink)
    Consciousness and Intentionality in Philosophy of Mind
    Representationalism in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 65.3Max Velmans (2000). A Psychologist's Map of Consciousness Studies. In Max Velmans (ed.), Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps. John Benjamins.
    Consciousness and Psychology, Misc in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
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  • 64.7Uriah Kriegel (2006). Consciousness: Phenomenal Consciousness, Access Consciousness, and Scientific Practice. In Paul R. Thagard (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.
    Key Terms: Phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, qualitative character, subjective character, intransitive self-consciousness, disposition, categorical basis, subliminal perception, blindsight.
    The Concept of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 64.6William G. Lycan (1995). Consciousness as Internal Monitoring. Philosophical Perspectives 9:1-14.
    Locke put forward the theory of consciousness as "internal Sense" or "reflection"; Kant made it inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state." 1 On that theory, consciousness is a perception-like second-order representing of our own psychological states events. The term "consciousness," of course, has many distinct uses.
    Higher-Order Perception Theories of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind
    Higher-Order Thought Theories of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind
    Immanuel Kant in 17th/18th Century Philosophy
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  • 64.5Eric Lormand (1996). Nonphenomenal Consciousness. Noûs 30 (2):242-61.
    There is not a uniform kind of consciousness common to all conscious mental states: beliefs, emotions, perceptual experiences, pains, moods, verbal thoughts, and so on. Instead, we need a distinction between phenomenal and nonphenomenal consciousness. As if consciousness simpliciter were not mysterious enough, philosophers have recently focused their worries on phenomenal (or qualitative) consciousness, the kind that explains or constitutes there being "something it.
    The Concept of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 63.6Andrea Lavazza (2007). Sense as a 'Translation' of Mental Contents. In Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti (eds.), Artificial Consciousness. Imprint Academic.
    The Stream of Consciousness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
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