Online research in philosophy

Can a moral defect be an artistic virtue? Can it make a positive contribution to artistic value? Further, if this can happen on occasion, does this imply that moral value has no systematic connection to artistic value since every conceivable relation between them is possible? The idea that moral defects can sometimes be artistic virtues has received a fair number of defenders recently and so has the anti-theoretical view that there is no systematic relation between artistic and moral value. But I think immoralism—as the first of these views is called—is mistaken and I will try to show that no good reason has been offered to believe it. If immoralism is wrong, the anti-theoretical view at best devolves into moderate moralism—the idea that moral defects sometimes, but not always, are responsible for artistic defects. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?

The main purpose of this paper is to argue that there are no minority moral rights. Rights claimed to be minority moral rights, such as land rights and hunting rights of indigenous peoples, and the political and language rights of some minority cultures, turn out to be either collective moral rights which are not also minority moral rights, or else to be merely (possibly morally justified) legal minority rights which are not also minority moral rights.

I develop and defend the following functional view of art: a work of art typically possesses as an essential feature one or more points, purposes, or ends with reference to the satisfaction of which that work can be appropriately evaluated. This way of seeing a work’s artistic value as dependent on its particular artistic ends (whatever they may be) suggests an answer to a longstanding question of what sort of internal relation, if any, exists between the wide variety of values (moral, cognitive, aesthetic, etc.) that may be possessed by works of art and their value qua works of art.

Much contemporary art seems morally out of control. Yet, philosophers seem to have trouble finding the right way to morally evaluate works of art. The debate between autonomists and moralists, I argue, has turned into a stalemate due to two mistaken assumptions. Against these assumptions, I argue that the moral nature of a work's contents does not transfer to the work and that, if we are to morally evaluate works we should try to conceive of them as moral agents. Ethical autonomism holds that art's autonomy consists in its demand that art appreciators take up an artistic attitude. A work's agency then is in how it merits their audiences' attitudinal switch. Ethical autonomism allows for the moral assessment of art works without giving up their autonomy, by viewing artistic merit as a moral category and art-relevant moral evaluation as having the form of art criticism.

In literary aesthetics, the debate on whether literary fictions provide propositional knowledge generally centres around the question whether there are authors’ explicit or implicit truth-claims in literary works and whether the reader’s act of looking for and assessing such claims as true or false is an appropriate stance toward the works as literary works. Nevertheless, in reading literary fiction, readers cannot always be sure whether the author is actually asserting or suggesting a view she expresses or presents because of the artistic and imaginative nature of the work. In this essay, I shall argue that in addition to asserting and suggesting, authors make use of a third way of conveying knowledge by their works: they invite the reader to genuinely or extra-fictionally contemplate unasserted thoughts or viewpoints to a given issue, or they offer hypotheses or provide the reader fictional material for constructing a hypothesis. The aim of this essay is to examine this rather unanalyzed but extremely wide grey zone: the author’s act of ‘contemplating’ and the cognitive value of its products which I shall call ‘literary hypotheses.’.

The grounds for recognizing that artists possess a personal “moral right of integrity” that would entitle them to prevent others from modifying their works are weak. There is, however, an important (and legislation-worthy) public interest in protecting highly-valued entities, including at least some works of art, from permanently destructive transformations.

Copyright law recognizes authors as the first owners of copyright. However, there is paucity of literature in copyright analysis of the author and the rights which should be granted by virtue of the very act of creativity in the production of literary and artistic works. This indicates insufficient attention paid to a concept that is so central to a law that primarily aims to encourage authorship for society's benefit. The idea of the author and authorship as a creative process is central to copyright analysis. Deeper analysis of the author and creative authorship will provide insights into how the law can work towards encouraging better author-reader connection and create a more efficient market for literary and artistic works to provide rewards to authors to encourage greater production of works to benefit society. This article proposes that conceptualizing authors as the most important figure for the grant of property rights will facilitate greater production of works that society will be willing to pay for in the market. This paper concludes that copyright is a law to encourage authors to create literary and artistic works for society. The rights granted under the law should encourage creative authorship, rather than a recovery of investment, and that public interests are served best by a law recognizing the creative author over the economic investor.

Political and moral philosophy teach that there are norms governing how individuals and states ought to behave to ensure a well functioning society. This paper argues that authorship is essentially an activity that can only occur when other individuals in society are constrained by particular moral and ethical norms, and when the copyright system is built on a theoretical framework where individuals in society agree to waive certain rights in order that authors may have the incentive to produce literary and artistic works. The law as it presently stands allocates entitlements without ethical or moral restraints on the exercise of private individual rights. Considerations of fairness and justice ought to be serious considerations in deciding how entitlements in literary and artistic works are allocated, and this paper utilizes theories of moral and political philosophy as a normative model for how individual rights ought to be exercised. This paper concludes that the allocation of entitlements in literary and artistic works ought to be in accordance with the mutual agreement individuals in society enter to provide rewards to authors, and prescribes certain ethical and moral norms that ought to be incorporated into the copyright system to fulfill this agreement.

Art works realize many values. According to tradition, not all of these values are characteristic of art: art works characteristically bear aesthetic value. Breaking with tradition, some now say that art works bear artistic value, as distinct from aesthetic value. I argue that there is no characteristic artistic value distinct from aesthetic value. The argument for this thesis suggests a new way to think about aesthetic value as it is characteristically realized by works of art.