William Rowe on the Evidential Value of Appearances

Faith and Philosophy 12 (2):251-259 (1995)
While William Rowe has argued that the principle of credulity does not lend justification to religious experience, he must affirm something quite like the principle of credulity in his empirical argument from evil. To do so Rowe has proposed a modified version of the principle of credulity.I shall argue that Rowe’s modified principle of credulity creates for him a dilemma regarding the justification of belief in other minds. I further suggest it is not adequate for bridging the logical gap between the existence of apparently pointless evils and the existence of genuinely pointless evil
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5840/faithphil199512217
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,217
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
William L. Rowe (1982). Religious Experience and the Principle of Credulity. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13 (2):85-92.
JIm Stone (2011). CORNEA, Scepticism and Evil. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):59-70.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

10 ( #410,593 of 1,932,467 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #225,373 of 1,932,467 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.