Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):103-116 (1982)
|Abstract||Gupta’s Rule of Revision theory of truth builds on insights to be found in Martin and Woodruff (1975) and Kripke (1975) (who in turn build on Tarski) in order to permanently deepen our understanding of truth, of paradox (and of the absence of it), and of how we work our language while our language is working us. His concept of a predicate deriving its meaning by way of a Rule of Revision ought to impact significantly on the philosophy of language. Still, fortunately, he has left me something to..|
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