Non‐seperability, non‐supervenience, and quantum ontology
Philosophy of Science 70 (4):791-811 (2003)
| Abstract | An argument to the effect that quantum mechanics commits us to the existence of non-supervenient relations, and therefore that we should admit such relations into our quantum ontology as fundamental entities, has been given by Teller and reformulated by French. This paper aims, first, to explicate and evaluate that argument; second, to extend its premises in order to assess its relevance for other interpretations of quantum mechanics; and, third, to clarify its implications for holism and individuation in quantum ontology. | |||||||||
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Michael Patrick Seevinck (2004). Holism, Physical Theories and Quantum Mechanics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 35 (4):693-712.
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