Putnam and constructibility

Erkenntnis 62 (3):395--409 (2005)
I discuss and try to evaluate the argument about constructible sets made by Putnam in ‘ ”Models and Reality”, and some of the counterarguments directed against it in the literature. I shall conclude that Putnam’s argument, while correct in substance, nevertheless has no direct bearing on the philosophical question of unintended models of set theory.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Ethics   Logic   Ontology
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DOI 10.2307/20013337
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References found in this work BETA
Hilary Putnam (1983). Realism and Reason. Cambridge University Press.
Hilary Putnam (1980). Models and Reality. Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3):464-482.
Akihiro Kanamori (2000). The Higher Infinite. Studia Logica 65 (3):443-446.
Timothy Bays (2001). On Putnam and His Models. Journal of Philosophy 98 (7):331-350.

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