Propensities and probabilities

Popper’s introduction of ‘‘propensity’’ was intended to provide a solid conceptual foundation for objective single-case probabilities. By considering the partly opposed contributions of Humphreys and Miller and Salmon, it is argued that when properly understood, propensities can in fact be understood as objective single-case causal probabilities of transitions between concrete events. The chief claim is that propensities are well-explicated by describing how they fit into the existing formal theory of branching space-times, which is simultaneously indeterministic and causal. Several problematic examples, some commonsense and some quantum-mechanical, are used to make clear the advantages of invoking branching space-times theory in coming to understand propensities.
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DOI 10.1016/j.shpsb.2006.09.003
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Müller (2005). Probability Theory and Causation: A Branching Space-Times Analysis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):487 - 520.
Karl R. Popper (1959). The Propensity Interpretation of Probability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):25-42.

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Citations of this work BETA
Thomas Muller (2007). A Branching Space-Times View on Quantum Error Correction. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (3):635-652.

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