Presentence, revision, truth, and paradox [Book Review]
Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):705–712 (2006)
|Abstract||Tim Maudiin’s Truth and Paradox (Maudlin 2004, cited here as T&P), a book that is richly endowed with interesting analyses and original theses, chooses to ignore both the prosentential theory of truth from Grover, Camp and Belnap 1975 and the revision theory in its book form, Gupta and Belnap 1993 (The Revision Theory of Truth, henceforth RTT).1 There is no discussion of either theory, nor even any mention of them in the list of references. I offer a pair of quotes chosen from among a number of T&P generalizations that Maudlin would doubtless have modified if RTT had been on his mind at the time of composition of T&P. (1) "...every acceptable account of truth seems to imply that the Tlnferences must be valid" (p. 15). My response is that the revision theory of truth is built on an explicit denial of this. Rather than taking them as "valid," RTT takes the T—Inferences as stage-of-revision—shifting revision principles in the context of a definitional account of truth. (2) "...most discussions of the Liar paradox and related paradoxes...do not address [such questions as]...where ['l`&P’s] Proof Lambda and Proof Gamma go wrong" (p. 20). In fact, RTT is not open to this criticism. It’s simple natural-deduction calculus C0 addresses exactly such questions.|
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