The aim of this paper1 is to attack Quine’s views on the analytic-synthetic distinction (ASD), but more than half of it will be devoted to arguing that an attack is still required. This preliminary thesis is based on the claim that what Quine presents as (1) an attack on the ASD, followed by (2) some remarks about confirmation and disconfirmation, offers a more formidable obstacle to the adherent of the traditional ASD if (2) is built into (1) as a positive but unwelcome theory of the..
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DOI 10.2307/4544610
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Amos Funkenstein (1975). Descartes, Eternal Truths, and the Divine Omnipotence. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 6 (3):185-199.

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