Are envy, anger, and resentment moral emotions?

Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):148 – 154 (2002)
The moral status of emotions has recently become the focus of various philosophical investigations. Certain emotions that have traditionally been considered as negative, such as envy, jealousy, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, and pride, have been defended. Some traditionally "negative" emotions have even been declared to be moral emotions. In this brief paper, I suggest two basic criteria according to which an emotion might be considered moral, and I then examine whether envy, anger, and resentment are moral emotions.
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DOI 10.1080/10002002058538728
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References found in this work BETA
Marguerite La Caze (2001). Envy and Resentment. Philosophical Explorations 4 (1):31 – 45.

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Citations of this work BETA
Krista K. Thomason (2015). The Moral Value of Envy. Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):36-53.
Kristján Kristjánsson (2003). On the Very Idea of "Negative Emotions". Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 33 (4):351–364.

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