Assertion, knowledge and predictions

Analysis 72 (1):102-105 (2012)
John N. Williams (1994) and Matthew Weiner (2005) invoke predictions in order to undermine the normative relevance of knowledge for assertions; in particular, Weiner argues, predictions are important counterexamples to the Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA). I argue here that they are not true counterexamples at all, a point that can be agreed upon even by those who reject KAA.
Keywords assertion  prediction  knowledge norm  norms of assertion  Matthew Weiner
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anr123
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References found in this work BETA
Matthew Weiner (2005). Must We Know What We Say? Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
Matt Weiner (2005). ``Must We Know What We Say?&Quot. Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
Michael Welbourne (1992). More on Moore. Analysis 52 (4):237 - 241.

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Citations of this work BETA
Peter Pagin (2015). Problems with Norms of Assertion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):n/a-n/a.
Matthew A. Benton (2016). Expert Opinion and Second‐Hand Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2).

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