Assertion, knowledge and predictions

Analysis 72 (1):102-105 (2012)
Abstract
John N. Williams (1994) and Matthew Weiner (2005) invoke predictions in order to undermine the normative relevance of knowledge for assertions; in particular, Weiner argues, predictions are important counterexamples to the Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA). I argue here that they are not true counterexamples at all, a point that can be agreed upon even by those who reject KAA
Keywords assertion  prediction  knowledge norm
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    References found in this work BETA
    Matthew Weiner (2005). Must We Know What We Say? Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
    Michael Welbourne (1992). More on Moore. Analysis 52 (4):237 - 241.
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