By Our Bootstraps

Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):27-41 (2011)
Abstract
Recently much has been made of the grounding relation, and of the idea that it is intimately tied to fundamentality. If A grounds B, then A is more fundamental than B (though not vice versa ), and A is ungrounded if and only if it is fundamental full stop—absolutely fundamental. But here is a puzzle: is grounding itself absolutely fundamental?
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.

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