Graduate studies at Western
Synthese 146 (3):245 - 282 (2005)
|Abstract||This paper examines Quine’s web of belief metaphor and its role in his various responses to conventionalism. Distinguishing between two versions of conventionalism, one based on the under-determination of theory, the other associated with a linguistic account of necessary truth, I show how Quine plays the two versions of conventionalism against each other. Some of Quine’s reservations about conventionalism are traced back to his 1934 lectures on Carnap. Although these lectures appear to endorse Carnap’s conventionalism, in exposing Carnap’s failure to provide an explanatory account of analytic truth, they in fact anticipate Quine’s later critique of conventionalism. I further argue that Quine eventually deconstructs both his own metaphor and the thesis of under-determination it serves to illustrate. This enables him to hold onto under-determination, but at the cost of depleting it of any real epistemic significance. Lastly, I explore the implications of this deconstruction for Quine’s indeterminacy of translation thesis.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Richard Creath (1991). Every Dogma has its Day. Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):347 - 389.
Roger F. Gibson (1986). Quine's Dilemma. Synthese 69 (1):27 - 39.
Eric J. Loomis (2006). Empirical Equivalence in the Quine-Carnap Debate. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):499–508.
Marian David (1996). Analyticity, Carnap, Quine, and Truth. Philosophical Perspectives 10:281 - 296.
H. G. Callaway (2003). The Esoteric Quine? Belief Attribution and the Significance of the Indeterminacy Thesis in Quine’s Kant Lectures. In H. G. Callaway (ed.), W.V. Quine, Wissenschaft und Empfindung. Frommann-Holzboog.
G. Ebbs (2011). Carnap and Quine on Truth by Convention. Mind 120 (478):193-237.
Yemima Ben-Menahem (2006). Conventionalism. Cambridge University Press.
Yemima Ben-Menahem (2001). Convention: Poincaré and Some of His Critics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):471-513.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads45 ( #29,007 of 739,345 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,538 of 739,345 )
How can I increase my downloads?