Philosophical Studies 162 (2):355-358 (2013)
|Abstract||The knowledge account of assertion—-roughly: one should not assert what one does not know—-can explain a variety of Moorean conjunctions, a fact often cited as evidence in its favor. David Sosa ("Dubious Assertions," Phil Studies, 2009) has objected that the account does not generalize satisfactorily, since it cannot explain the infelicity of certain iterated conjunctions without appealing to the controversial "KK" principle. This essay responds by showing how the knowledge account can handle such conjunctions without use of the KK principle.|
|Keywords||Norms of Assertion Knowledge Norm Moore David Sosa|
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