Dubious objections from iterated conjunctions

Philosophical Studies 162 (2):355-358 (2013)
Abstract
The knowledge account of assertion—-roughly: one should not assert what one does not know—-can explain a variety of Moorean conjunctions, a fact often cited as evidence in its favor. David Sosa ("Dubious Assertions," Phil Studies, 2009) has objected that the account does not generalize satisfactorily, since it cannot explain the infelicity of certain iterated conjunctions without appealing to the controversial "KK" principle. This essay responds by showing how the knowledge account can handle such conjunctions without use of the KK principle.
Keywords Norms of Assertion  Knowledge Norm  Moore  David Sosa
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PhilPapers Archive Matthew A. Benton, Dubious objections from iterated conjunctions
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References found in this work BETA
Keith DeRose (2002). Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Keith DeRose (1991). Epistemic Possibilities. Philosophical Review 100 (4):581-605.

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Citations of this work BETA
Martin Montminy (2013). Explaining Dubious Assertions. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):825-830.
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