Everything Else Being Equal: A Modal Logic for Ceteris Paribus Preferences

Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (1):83 - 125 (2009)
This paper presents a new modal logic for ceteris paribus preferences understood in the sense of "all other things being equal". This reading goes back to the seminal work of Von Wright in the early 1960's and has returned in computer science in the 1990' s and in more abstract "dependency logics" today. We show how it differs from ceteris paribus as "all other things being normal", which is used in contexts with preference defeaters. We provide a semantic analysis and several completeness theorems. We show how our system links up with Von Wright's work, and how it applies to game-theoretic solution concepts, to agenda setting in investigation, and to preference change. We finally consider its relation with infinitary modal logics.
Keywords Philosophy
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DOI 10.2307/40344054
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References found in this work BETA
Johan van Benthem (2007). Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (2):129-155.
Johan van Benthem & Fenrong Liu (2007). Dynamic Logic of Preference Upgrade. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (2):157-182.

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Citations of this work BETA
Fenrong Liu (2011). A Two-Level Perspective on Preference. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (3):421 - 439.

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