Graduate studies at Western
Theory and Decision 45 (2):99-159 (1998)
|Abstract||To understand the meaning of evolutionary equilibria, it is necessary to comprehend the ramifications of the evolutionary model. For instance, a full appreciation of Axelrod's The Evolution of Cooperation requires that we identify assumptions under which conditionally cooperative strategies, like Tit For Tat, are and are not evolutionarily stable. And more generally, when does stability fail? To resolve these questions we re-examine the very foundations of the evolutionary model. The results of this paper can be analytically separated into three parts. The first part is conceptual: it identifies the evolutionary model's assumptions and shows how different assumptions imply different types of evolutionary stability. The second part is deductive: it establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for the types of evolutionary stability identified in the first part, and demonstrates in which games these kinds of stability can (and cannot) be attained. The third and final part is applied: it relates the general findings (which are independent of the specific payoffs of any particular evolutionary game) to the issue of the evolutionary stability of cooperation. Results on cooperation appear throughout the paper as they both exemplify and motivate the general results. These results essentially explain when cooperation is and is not stable, and why, thus shedding new light on the meaning and applicability of Axelrod's widely known claims|
|Keywords||Evolutionary game theory Evolutionarily stable strategies Evolutionary equilibria Evolution of cooperation Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) Tit For Tat (TFT)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Brian Skyrms (2002). Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information. Philosophy of Science 69 (3):407-428.
Kim Sterelny, Richard Joyce, Brett Calcott & Ben Fraser (eds.) (2013). Cooperation and its Evolution. MIT Press.
Mathias Spichtig & Christian Traxler, Social Norms and the Indirect Evolution of Conditional Cooperation.
Paul Thompson (1983). Tempo and Mode in Evolution: Punctuated Equilibria and the Modern Synthetic Theory. Philosophy of Science 50 (3):432 - 452.
Juha Tuomi (1992). Evolutionary Synthesis: A Search for the Strategy. Philosophy of Science 59 (3):429-438.
David N. Stamos (1996). Popper, Falsifiability, and Evolutionary Biology. Biology and Philosophy 11 (2):161-191.
Bence Nanay (2002). Evolutionary Psychology and the Selectionist Model of Neural Development: A Combined Approach. Evolution and Cognition.
Roger A. McCain (2007). Probabilistic Equilibria for Evolutionarily Stable Strategies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):34-36.
Frederick Rauscher (1997). How a Kantian Can Accept Evolutionary Metaethics. Biology and Philosophy 12 (3):303-326.
Herbert Gintis (2006). Behavioral Ethics Meets Natural Justice. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5 (1):5-32.
Alasdair I. Houston & John M. McNamara (2005). John Maynard Smith and the Importance of Consistency in Evolutionary Game Theory. Biology and Philosophy 20 (5):933-950.
Lee Alan Dugatkin (2002). Cooperation in Animals: An Evolutionary Overview. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 17 (4):459-476.
Richard Samuels (1998). Evolutionary Psychology and the Massive Modularity Hypothesis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (4):575-602.
Added to index2010-09-02
Total downloads3 ( #213,863 of 739,396 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,680 of 739,396 )
How can I increase my downloads?