Global supervenience and dependence

Two versions of global supervenience have recently been distinguished from each other. I introduce a third version, which is more likely what people had in mind all along. However, I argue that one of the three versions is equivalent to strong supervenience in every sense that matters, and that neither of the other two versions counts as a genuine determination relation. I conclude that global supervenience has little metaphysically distinctive value
Keywords Dependence  Global  Metaphysics  Possible World  Supervenience  Variation
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00364.x
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Jessica M. Wilson (2010). What is Hume's Dictum, and Why Believe It? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):595 - 637.
Louis deRosset (2010). Getting Priority Straight. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):73 - 97.
Fabrice Correia (2008). Ontological Dependence. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1013-1032.

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