Global supervenience and dependence

Abstract
Two versions of global supervenience have recently been distinguished from each other. I introduce a third version, which is more likely what people had in mind all along. However, I argue that one of the three versions is equivalent to strong supervenience in every sense that matters, and that neither of the other two versions counts as a genuine determination relation. I conclude that global supervenience has little metaphysically distinctive value
Keywords Dependence  Global  Metaphysics  Possible World  Supervenience  Variation
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    References found in this work BETA
    Lynne Rudder Baker (1993). Metaphysics and Mental Causation. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. 75-96.

    View all 25 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Louis deRosset (2010). Getting Priority Straight. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):73 - 97.
    Jessica M. Wilson (2010). What is Hume's Dictum, and Why Believe It? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):595 - 637.
    Mark Moyer (2008). Weak and Global Supervenience Are Strong. Philosophical Studies 138 (1):125 - 150.
    Katherine Hawley (2008). Persistence and Determination. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62 (62):197-212.

    View all 11 citations

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