David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 136 (1):31 - 57 (2007)
We begin with a puzzle: why do some know-how attributions entail ability attributions while others do not? After rejecting the tempting response that know-how attributions are ambiguous, we argue that a satisfactory answer to the puzzle must acknowledge the connection between know-how and concept possession (specifically, reasonable conceptual mastery, or understanding). This connection appears at first to be grounded solely in the cognitive nature of certain activities. However, we show that, contra anti-intellectualists, the connection between know-how and concept possession can be generalized via reflection on the cognitive nature of intentional action and the potential of certain misunderstandings to undermine know-how even when the corresponding abilities and associated propositional knowledge are in place. Such considerations make explicit the intimate relation between know-how and understanding, motivating a general intellectualist analysis of the former in terms of the latter
|Keywords||Know-how Concept possession Ability Propositional knowledge Understanding Intellectualism|
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References found in this work BETA
George Bealer (2004). An Inconsistency in Direct Reference Theory. Journal of Philosophy 101 (11):574 - 593.
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Citations of this work BETA
Ángel Pinillos, Nick Smith, G. Shyam Nair, Cecilea Mun & Peter Marchetto (2011). Philosophy's New Challenge: Experiments and Intentional Action. Mind and Language 26 (1):115-139.
Eva-Maria Jung & Albert Newen (2010). Knowledge and Abilities: The Need for a New Understanding of Knowing-How. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):113-131.
Victor Kumar (2011). In Support of Anti-Intellectualism. Philosophical Studies 152 (1):135-54.
John Bengson, Marc A. Moffett & Jennifer C. Wright (2009). The Folk on Knowing How. Philosophical Studies 142 (3):387–401.
Yuri Cath (2013). Regarding a Regress. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):358-388.
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