Know-how and concept possession

Philosophical Studies 136 (1):31 - 57 (2007)
Abstract
We begin with a puzzle: why do some know-how attributions entail ability attributions while others do not? After rejecting the tempting response that know-how attributions are ambiguous, we argue that a satisfactory answer to the puzzle must acknowledge the connection between know-how and concept possession (specifically, reasonable conceptual mastery, or understanding). This connection appears at first to be grounded solely in the cognitive nature of certain activities. However, we show that, contra anti-intellectualists, the connection between know-how and concept possession can be generalized via reflection on the cognitive nature of intentional action and the potential of certain misunderstandings to undermine know-how even when the corresponding abilities and associated propositional knowledge are in place. Such considerations make explicit the intimate relation between know-how and understanding, motivating a general intellectualist analysis of the former in terms of the latter
Keywords Know-how  Concept possession  Ability  Propositional knowledge  Understanding  Intellectualism
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    References found in this work BETA
    George Bealer (1993). A Solution to Frege's Puzzle. Philosophical Perspectives 7:17-60.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Victor Kumar (2011). In Support of Anti-Intellectualism. Philosophical Studies 152 (1):135-54.
    Yuri Cath (2013). Regarding a Regress. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):358-388.

    View all 11 citations

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