Law and Philosophy 18 (3):243 - 270 (1999)
|Abstract||The main argument of this paper is that there are reasons for judges not only to evaluate the substantive merit of legislation, but to advert to the fact that the place of elected legislatures in our scheme of government gives legislation a standing, an entitlement to consideration, that may go beyond judicial estimates of its intrinsic merit.|
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