PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:249 - 254 (1988)
|Abstract||The heuristics and strategies presented in Lakatos' Proofs and Refutations are well-known. However they hardly present the whole story as many authors have shown. In this paper a recent, rather spectacular, event in the history of mathematics is examined to gather evidence for two new strategies. The first heuristic concerns the expectations mathematicians have that a statement will be proved using given methods. The second heuristic tries to make sense of the mathematicians' notion of the quality of a proof.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||No categories specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Carlo Cellucci (2008). Why Proof? What is a Proof? In Giovanna Corsi & Rossella Lupacchini (eds.), Deduction, Computation, Experiment. Exploring the Effectiveness of Proof, pp. 1-27. Springer.
Jean Paul Van Bendegem (2005). Proofs and Arguments: The Special Case of Mathematics. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1):157-169.
Imre Lakatos (1976). Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery. Cambridge University Press.
Edwin Coleman (2009). The Surveyability of Long Proofs. Foundations of Science 14 (1-2):27-43.
Yehuda Rav (2007). A Critique of a Formalist-Mechanist Version of the Justification of Arguments in Mathematicians' Proof Practices. Philosophia Mathematica 15 (3):291-320.
John W. Dawson Jr (2006). Why Do Mathematicians Re-Prove Theorems? Philosophia Mathematica 14 (3).
Ian J. Dove (2009). Towards a Theory of Mathematical Argument. Foundations of Science 14 (1-2):136-152.
Olga Kiss (2006). Heuristic, Methodology or Logic of Discovery? Lakatos on Patterns of Thinking. Perspectives on Science 14 (3):302-317.
Jody Azzouni (2009). Why Do Informal Proofs Conform to Formal Norms? Foundations of Science 14 (1-2):9-26.
James Robert Brown (1990). Proof and Truth in Lakatos's Masterpiece. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (2):117 – 130.
Izabela Bondecka-Krzykowska (1999). Dowody komputerowe a status epistemologiczny twierdzeń matematyki. Filozofia Nauki 3.
John Kadvany (2003). Letters. Philosophia Mathematica 11 (3):364-364.
Don Fallis, What Do Mathematicians Want? Probabilistic Proofs and the Epistemic Goals of Mathematicians.
David Corfield (2003). Towards a Philosophy of Real Mathematics. Cambridge University Press.
Added to index2011-05-29
Total downloads4 ( #178,473 of 548,984 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,327 of 548,984 )
How can I increase my downloads?