New Reasons to Motivate Trope Theory: Endurantism and Perdurantism

Acta Analytica 28 (2):223-227 (2013)
In this paper, I argue that (non-presentist) endurantism is incompatible with the view that properties are universals. I do so by putting forward a very simple objection that forces the endurantist to embrace tropes, rather than universals. I do not claim that this is bad news for the endurantist—trope theory seems to me by all means more appealing than universals—rather, I would like to see this result as a further motivation to embrace tropes. I then also put forward a (more controversial) reason to believe that at least some versions of perdurantism also require tropes rather than universals
Keywords Endurantism  Perdurantism  Tropes  Universals
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-012-0166-0
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References found in this work BETA
L. A. Paul (2002). Logical Parts. Noûs 36 (4):578–596.
Mark Johnston (1987). Is There a Problem About Persistence? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:107-135.

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