On (not) being in two places at the same time: an argument against endurantism

American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):239 - 248 (2009)
Abstract
Is there an entity such that it can be in two places at the same time ? According to one traditional view, properties can, since they are immanent universals. But what about objects such as a person or a table ? Common sense seems to say that, unlike properties, objects are not multiply locatable. In this paper, I will argue first of all that endurantism entails a consequence that is quite bizarre, namely, that objects are universals, while properties are particulars. I then conclude by examining and rejecting two theories according to which objects can wholly be in two places at the same time.
Keywords endurantism  universals  tropes  perdurantism  objects  ontology
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PhilPapers Archive Jiri Benovsky, On (not) being in two places at the same time: an argument against endurantism
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