Presentism and persistence

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):291-309 (2009)
In this paper, I examine various theories of persistence through time under presentism. In Part I, I argue that both perdurantist views (namely, the worm view and the stage view) suffer, in combination with presentism, from serious difficulties and should be rejected. In Part II, I discuss the presentist endurantist view, to see that it does avoid the difficulties of the perdurantist views, and consequently that it does work, but at a price that some may consider as being very high: its ontological commitments to platonic universals and to the substratum theory, that as we shall see follow from the combination of endurantism with presentism, will perhaps not be to everyone's taste.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01341.x
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References found in this work BETA
Sally Haslanger (2003). Persistence Through Time. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press 315--354.

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Citations of this work BETA
Ernâni Magalhães (2011). Presentism, Persistence and Composition. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):509-523.

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