Perception, judgment and individuation: Towards a metaphysics of particularity

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (4):481 – 500 (2007)
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to develop a new theory of particularity. In so doing it redefines the concepts 'perception' and 'judgment'. The redefinition occurs once perception is understood as recognition. The move to recognition entails the centrality of repetition. Recognition, it is argued, is a form of repetition. Allowing for repetition necessitates changing the way the relationship between universals and particulars is understood. This is developed via an engagement with Hume and Plato. The article concludes with the outline for a rethinking of the metaphysics of particularity

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Andrew Benjamin
Monash University

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