Priority monism, physical intentionality and the internal relatedness of all things

Abstract
Schaffer (2010) argues that the internal relatedness of all things, no matter how it is conceived, entails priority monism. He claims that a sufficiently pervasive internal relation among objects implies the priority of the whole, understood as a concrete object. This paper shows that at least in the case of an internal relatedness of all things conceived in terms of physical intentionality - one way to understand dispositions - priority monism not only doesn't follow but also is precluded. We conclude that the internal relatedness of all things is compatible with several different ontologies (including varieties of pluralism) but entails nothing concerning dependence between concrete objects.
Keywords Schaffer  Priority monism  Physical intentionality  Internal relations  types
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PhilPapers Archive Hilan Bensusan, Priority monism, physical intentionality and the internal relatedness of all things
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