Online research in philosophy

I argue for the possibility of substantive aesthetic disagreements in which both parties speak truly. The possibility of such disputes undermines an argument mobilized by relativists such as Lasersohn (Linguist Philos 28:643–686, 2005) and MacFarlane (Philos Stud 132:17–31, 2007) against contextualism about aesthetic terminology. In describing the facts of aesthetic disagreement, I distinguish between the intuition of dispute on the one hand and the felicity of denial on the other. Considered separately, neither of those phenomena requires that there be a single proposition asserted by one party to an aesthetic dispute and denied by the other. I suggest instead that many such disputes be analyzed as disputes over the selection or appropriateness of a contextually salient aesthetic standard.

Aesthetic realism is offered as a way of overcoming aesthetic disagreement and combating all forms of subjectivism, emotivism, and so on, with its thesis that aesthetic qualities really exist and the judgements about them are genuine statements of fact. This paper questions the intelligibility of that thesis together with its claim that aesthetic qualities are supervenient upon non-aesthetic ones. It is suggested that in this context supervenience amounts to little more than aspect perception and that allows ontological claims about supervenient qualities to be rejected. Subjectivism, however, is not the alternative. Neither realism nor subjectivism do justice to the complexity of aesthetic judgements and the roles that they play in our lives. It is suggested that the nature of these judgements is best pursued through Wittgenstein’s notions of aspect perception and imponderable evidence.

Abstract Disagreement persists concerning whether aesthetic properties supervene on non-aesthetic properties. This issue is complicated by the fact that the notion of an aesthetic property is itself contentious. In this paper, I begin by identifying three conditions that arguably characterize a large number of aesthetic properties. After defending aesthetic supervenience against a number of objections, I argue that a strong version of the supervenience thesis applies to those properties that satisfy my initial conditions.

I consider and reject four possible arguments directed against the preservation of natural aesthetic conditions. (1) Beauty is not out there in nature, but is “in the eye ofthe beholder.” I argue that since ingredients ofnature cause aesthetic experiences, we cannot justifiably disregard and exploit nature. Preservation of aesthetic conditions is compatible with both objective and nonobjective theories of aesthetic value. (2) Frequent aesthetic disagreements bring about irresolvable disputes concerning which segments of nature to preserve. I claim that these disputes are not irresolvable. Not all disputes about nature’s aesthetic values are purely aesthetic disputes: ecological balance, community identity, historic continuity, and economics are relevant; aesthetic experts can help; and such disputes can be put to a vote. (3) Natural beauty is not important compared to nonaesthetic values of nature. I show that this is questionable. Current awareness of environmental problems includes a rapidly growing concern for natural aesthetics. Moreover, even if majority preference is for nonaesthetic uses of nature, this does not settle the question of whether we ought to preserve nature’s attractive features. (4) From neither a utilitarian nor a deontological viewpoint do we have an obligation to preserve natural aesthetic conditions for future generations. I argue that even if we do not have a strict obligation, it does not follow that it makes no moral difference whether we preserve. Not yet existing people may have no rights against us, but this does not mean that we do no wrong in polluting and destroying aesthetic conditions of the natural world in which future people will live.