Two approaches to memory

Philosophical Investigations 9 (October):288-301 (1986)
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Keywords Epistemology  Memory  Mind  Relation  Substance
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    Aaron Ben-zeev (1987). A Critique of the Inferential Paradigm in Perception. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 17 (3):243–263.
    Eugene Winograd (1996). Contexts and Functions of Retrieval. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (2):209.

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