Studia Philosophica Estonica 1:1-4 (2008)
|Abstract||Ordinary objects are vague, because either (i) composition is restricted, or (ii) there really are no such objects (but we still want to talk about them), or (iii) because such objects are not metaphysically (independently of us) distinguishable from other 'extra-ordinary' objects. In any sense in which there are ordinary objects, they are vague.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Shunsuke Yatabe & Hiroyuki Inaoka (2006). On Evans's Vague Object From Set Theoretic Viewpoint. Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (4):423 - 434.
Peter M. Simons (1999). Does the Sun Exist? The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1999:89-97.
Jonathan Schaffer (2009). The Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson's Ordinary Objects. Philosophical Books 50 (3):142-157.
Joseph G. Moore (2008). A Modal Argument Against Vague Objects. Philosophers' Imprint 8 (12):1-17.
Daniel Z. Korman (2007). The Naive Conception of Material Objects: A Defense. Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin
Elisa Paganini (2011). Vague Objects Without Ontically Indeterminate Identity. Erkenntnis 74 (3):351-362.
Added to index2009-11-23
Total downloads53 ( #19,343 of 549,067 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #10,311 of 549,067 )
How can I increase my downloads?