Truth, correspondence, and non-denoting singular terms

Philosophia 9 (2):219-229 (1980)
The correspondence theory of truth provides standard semantics with a simple scheme for evaluating sentences. This scheme however depends on the existence of basic correspondences between singular terms and objects, And thus breaks down in the case of non-Denoting singular terms. An alternative to the correspondence theory is thus called for in dealing with such terms. The author criticizes various positions discussed in the literature in this regard, And then presents a solution of his own
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DOI 10.1007/BF02379119
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Scott Lehmann (1994). Strict Fregean Free Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (3):307--336.

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