The causal efficiency of the passage of time

Philosophia 40 (4):763-769 (2012)
Abstract
Does mere passage of time have causal powers ? Are properties like "being n days past" causally efficient ? A pervasive intuition among metaphysicians seems to be that they don't. Events and/or objects change, and they cause or are caused by other events and/or objects; but one does not see how just the mere passage of time could cause any difference in the world. In this paper, I shall discuss a case where it seems that mere passage of time does have causal powers : Sydney Shoemaker's (1969) possible world where temporal vacua (allegedly) take place. I shall argue that Shoemaker's thought-experiment doesn't really aim at teaching us that there can be time without change, but rather that if such a scenario is plausible at all (as I think it is) it provides us with good reasons to think that mere passage of time can be directly causally efficient.
Keywords passage of time  A-theory  causation
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References found in this work BETA
Mauro Dorato & Michael Esfeld (2010). GRW as an Ontology of Dispositions. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 41 (1):41-49.
Roman Frigg & Carl Hoefer (2007). Probability in GRW Theory. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (2):371-389.
David Lewis (1976). The Paradoxes of Time Travel. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (2):145-152.

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