David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 142 (3):387–401 (2009)
It has been claimed that the attempt to analyze know-how in terms of propositional knowledge over-intellectualizes the mind. Exploiting the methods of so-called “experimental philosophy”, we show that the charge of over-intellectualization is baseless. Contra neo-Ryleans, who analyze know-how in terms of ability, the concrete-case judgments of ordinary folk are most consistent with the view that there exists a set of correct necessary and sufficient conditions for know-how that does not invoke ability, but rather a certain sort of propositional knowledge. To the extent that one’s considered judgments agree with those of the folk (or to the extent that one is unwilling to contravene widespread judgments), this constitutes a strong prima facie case against neo-Ryleanism
|Keywords||Ability Anti-intellectualism Intellectualism Know-how Over-intellectualization Praxism Propositional knowledge Understanding|
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References found in this work BETA
Colin Allen & Marc Bekoff (1997). Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology. MIT Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Victor Kumar (2011). In Support of Anti-Intellectualism. Philosophical Studies 152 (1):135-54.
Wesley Buckwalter (2012). Non-Traditional Factors in Judgments About Knowledge. Philosophy Compass 7 (4):278-289.
Jason Stanley (2011). Knowing (How). Noûs 45 (2):207 - 238.
N. Ángel Pinillos (2011). Some Recent Work in Experimental Epistemology. Philosophy Compass 6 (10):675-688.
Yuri Cath (2013). Regarding a Regress. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):358-388.
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