The folk on knowing how

Philosophical Studies 142 (3):387–401 (2009)
It has been claimed that the attempt to analyze know-how in terms of propositional knowledge over-intellectualizes the mind. Exploiting the methods of so-called “experimental philosophy”, we show that the charge of over-intellectualization is baseless. Contra neo-Ryleans, who analyze know-how in terms of ability, the concrete-case judgments of ordinary folk are most consistent with the view that there exists a set of correct necessary and sufficient conditions for know-how that does not invoke ability, but rather a certain sort of propositional knowledge. To the extent that one’s considered judgments agree with those of the folk (or to the extent that one is unwilling to contravene widespread judgments), this constitutes a strong prima facie case against neo-Ryleanism
Keywords Ability  Anti-intellectualism  Intellectualism  Know-how  Over-intellectualization  Praxism  Propositional knowledge  Understanding
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/27734377
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,914
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard (2014). Knowledge‐How and Cognitive Achievement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):181-199.
Jason Stanley (2011). Knowing (How). Noûs 45 (2):207 - 238.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

143 ( #13,246 of 1,725,611 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

20 ( #42,222 of 1,725,611 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.