The folk on knowing how
Philosophical Studies 142 (3):387–401 (2009)
| Abstract | It has been claimed that the attempt to analyze know-how in terms of propositional knowledge over-intellectualizes the mind. Exploiting the methods of so-called “experimental philosophy”, we show that the charge of over-intellectualization is baseless. Contra neo-Ryleans, who analyze know-how in terms of ability, the concrete-case judgments of ordinary folk are most consistent with the view that there exists a set of correct necessary and sufficient conditions for know-how that does not invoke ability, but rather a certain sort of propositional knowledge. To the extent that one’s considered judgments agree with those of the folk (or to the extent that one is unwilling to contravene widespread judgments), this constitutes a strong prima facie case against neo-Ryleanism | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,664 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesWesley Buckwalter (2010). Knowledge Isn't Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):395-406.
Alfred R. Mele (2003). Intentional Action: Controversies, Data, and Core Hypotheses. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):325-340.
Heidi Lene Maibom (2003). The Mindreader and the Scientist. Mind and Language 18 (3):296-315.
Ian Ravenscroft, Folk Psychology as a Theory. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads90 ( #7,727 of 549,014 )Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #19,160 of 549,014 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
