Two more for the knowledge account of assertion

Analysis 71 (4):684-687 (2011)
The Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA) has received added support recently from data on prompting assertion (Turri 2010) and from a refinement suggesting that assertions ought to express knowledge (Turri 2011). This paper adds another argument from parenthetical positioning, and then argues that KAA’s unified explanation of some of the earliest data (from Moorean conjunctions) adduced in its favor recommends KAA over its rivals.
Keywords assertion  knowledge norm  Moore's paradox
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anr085
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References found in this work BETA
Matthew Weiner (2005). Must We Know What We Say? Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
Matt Weiner (2005). ``Must We Know What We Say?&Quot. Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.

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Citations of this work BETA
Peter Pagin (2015). Problems with Norms of Assertion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):n/a-n/a.
Matthew A. Benton (2016). Expert Opinion and Second‐Hand Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2).

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