Two more for the knowledge account of assertion

Analysis 71 (4):684-687 (2011)
Abstract
The Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA) has received added support recently from data on prompting assertion (Turri 2010) and from a refinement suggesting that assertions ought to express knowledge (Turri 2011). This paper adds another argument from parenthetical positioning, and then argues that KAA’s unified explanation of some of the earliest data (from Moorean conjunctions) adduced in its favor recommends KAA over its rivals.
Keywords assertion  knowledge norm  Moore's paradox
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    References found in this work BETA
    Matthew Weiner (2005). Must We Know What We Say? Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
    Citations of this work BETA
    Rachel McKinnon & John Turri (2013). Irksome Assertions. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):123-128.

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